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The crisis in Syria has been widely recognized as constituting a multi-dimensional 
threat to international security. It is seen as a humanitarian crisis, a breeding ground of 
transnational terrorism, a site of the use of WMDs and as a failed state. Some see it as a 
turning point in which the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians was abdicated by the 
international community. It can also be seen as a new site to understand the conduct of 
‘New Wars,’ and of insurgency and counter-insurgency, as this chapter proposes. The 
intractability of the conflict is a challenge to our thinking on conflict resolution and the 
conduct of diplomacy to address internal wars. The conflict has been a site of vociferous 
debates among theorists and practitioners over how the international community should 
respond (Kaldor 2013, Falk 2014). 
 
This chapter has five parts. In the first, the context and roots of the conflict are 
introduced. It explains why the non-violent resistance paradigm failed to predict the 
dynamics of the Syrian uprising and shows that in the Syrian case, the conflict was first 
about (economic) class grievances and only then turned into a sectarianized conflict. In 
the second, the Syrian conflict is looked at through theories of ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 
1999) and insurgency and counter-insurgency. In the third, the dynamics of violence are 
described, first by looking at human security vs. state security, and then by focusing on 
the responsibility to protect-norm and its influence on the conflict. The fourth section, 
of the chapter looks at the obstacles to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. The 
conclusion considers the implications of the Syria conflict for security theory and 
practice. 
 
CONTEXT AND ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT 
 
State-Building Dilemmas 
The Syria crisis is ultimately rooted in what Ayoob (1995) called the ‘Third World 
security predicament’. This signifies the challenge of 20th century state developers who 
undertake primitive power accumulation in a world in which populations have much 
greater demands for participation and welfare in comparison to earlier times; and also 
when the violent methods of earlier state builders (e.g. see Tilly 1985), are no longer 
seen as legitimate. This Third World security predicament is exacerbated in the case of 
Syria and its state building dilemmas. The starting point for the current crisis can be 
traced back to the post-WWI imposition of a system of states in the region in what 
David Fromkin (1989) called a ‘peace to end all peace.’ The Levant states, artificially 
created by Western imperialism in violation of the dominant identities of the region’s 
peoples, had to compete with powerful sub- and supra-state forces for the loyalties of 
their populations, and hence suffered built-in legitimacy deficits, which made them 
more likely to fail.  
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In these circumstances, Arab state builders gravitated toward neo-patrimonial practices 
that combined time-honoured indigenous state-building formulas--Ibn Khaldun’s 
assabiya or elite solidarity built on primordial ties--with modern bureaucratic and 
security machinery, coupled with surveillance technology. This formula was 
empowered, beyond its ‘shelf life,’ by the exceptional availability of hydrocarbon and 
geopolitical rent in the region. It enabled the lubrication of clientele networks 
supportive of neo-patrimonial rule and for a period enabled a populist ‘social contract’ 
with the masses.  
 
Ba’thist populist authoritarianism in Syria was no exception: Hafiz al-Asad established 
a regime that combined reliance on the assabiya of his Alawi followers – who he 
appointed to strategic commands of the military-security apparatus; rent-fuelled 
clientelist co-optation of a cross-sectarian coalition of Ba’thi politicos and Sunni 
business elements; and mass incorporation through the Ba’th party of the state-
employed middle class, trade unionists and big segments of the peasantry (via land 
reform). This regime was legitimized by Arab nationalist ideology and defended by the 
repression of persistent (mostly Islamic) opposition.  
 
Yet each ingredient of this state building recipe had its costs: sectarian assabiya 
alienated out-groups; rent was finite and its decline enervated co-optative capability; 
repression left many politically unincorporated; and legitimation from Arab nationalism 
embroiled Syria in costly regional conflicts and generated Western hostility, which 
became particularly dangerous once Asad lost his Cold war era Soviet patron. 
Furthermore, relying on sub-state (Alawi) and supra-state loyalties (Arabism) deterred 
consolidation of identifications with the Syrian state itself (Hinnebusch 2001). 
 
Across the region, a combination of rent decline and population boom created economic 
crises that put extreme pressures on the authoritarian republics to move toward what 
might be called ‘post-populism’. In post-populism, the state withdraws from welfare 
provision and favours investors, thereby creating a new crony capitalism and 
exacerbating social inequality. Twin global forces exacerbated the situation: neo-liberal 
globalization, as manifested in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s ‘structural 
adjustment’ campaigns, reduced the capacity of the oil-poor authoritarian republics to 
materially satisfy mass constituencies. In parallel, the global diffusion of internet 
technology -- and with it, West-centric democratization discourses -- helped to 
delegitimize authoritarian post-populist ruling formulas (Hinnebusch 2012). In Syria, 
the younger Asad’s post-populism sowed the seeds of the Syrian Uprising and the 
subsequent protracted conflict. 
   
From Non-Violent Protest to the Domestic Security Dilemma 
According to the mass non-violent protest paradigm (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), 
mass protest can rapidly and effectively destabilize authoritarian regimes; even if the 
regime refuses protestors’ demands and uses violence against them. The literature 
predicts that use of violence is likely to backfire, since it stimulates wider anti-regime 
mobilization, triggers international sanctions and support for the opposition, and most 
importantly, causes defections in the security forces, which will be reluctant to use 
violence against fellow citizens who are not, themselves, using violence. This scenario 
could have been part of the calculations of the Syrian protestors who, in large numbers, 
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took on the regime after March 2011. The outcome, however, was neither democratic 
transition, revolution nor effective repression, but stalemated semi-sectarian civil war. It 
was not inevitable that the Syrian Uprising would descend into sectarian civil war; so 
what went wrong? 
 
Security studies have increasingly focused on the causes of internal wars like Syria’s. 
Studies of communal (ethnic and religious) conflict are differentiated between 
‘essentialists’ that see ancient hatreds as rooted in history, and ‘instrumentalists’ who 
see these hatreds stirred up by leaders or their opponents (Kaufman 2008: 203-04). 
Syria comes much closer to the latter model. As a fragmented state composed of many 
religious and ethnic minorities, artificially constructed by Western imperialism and with 
a fragile sense of shared identity, Syria had built-in vulnerabilities. The regime’s use of 
sectarian solidarity assabiyya had also created resentments among the majority Sunni 
population while the minority but politically-dominant Alawis had a strong sense of 
insecurity rooted in the previous Islamic fundamentalist insurgency of the 1980s that 
played on sectarian differences (Goldsmith 2011).  
 
Still, Syria’s sects did not hate each other. In fact, considerable intermarriage and inter-
sectarian business alliances were evident in the 2000s. The Alawi-led ruling coalition 
had long included many of the Sunni majority (and still does) and had built an alliance 
with the Sunni dominated business class. Rather than being chiefly an issue of sectarian 
politics, the conditions for the revolt were prepared by the regime’s turn to neo-liberal 
policies, marginalizing its formal rural constituency and promoting the unequal 
enrichment of urban-based crony capitalists. The main grievances were economic 
initially: the conflict was about class and urban-rural cleavages. The discourse of the 
protestors was secular, inclusive and cross-sectarian, although a perception of 
favouritism in access to opportunity gave a sectarian edge to socio-economic 
grievances.   
 
Once the opposition was able to flood the streets with interminable protests, the regime 
found itself on the defensive--as in the non-violent protest paradigm. But why did this 
not create the conditions for a democratic transition? While the mass non-violent protest 
paradigm gives little attention to the dynamics of such a transition, democratization 
studies suggest (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) that non-violent protest is only likely to 
lead to a peaceful transition if a coalition between soft-liners in the regime and in the 
opposition manages to marginalize the hardliners (as happened, in some respects, in 
Tunisia and Egypt). In the Syrian case, however, the soft-liners were marginalized on 
both sides.  
 
Asad’s choice to respond to the demonstrations with a ‘security solution’ rather than 
democratic reforms was decisive: in standing with regime hardliners, he empowered the 
hardliners in the opposition as well. In resorting to a sectarian discourse against 
‘terrorism’ and increasing state violence against opponents, Asad helped turn peaceful 
protests into violent sectarian conflict. Equally important were the maximalist demands 
of the opposition: the removal of the regime. Arguably, the mistake of the Syrian protest 
movement was its ‘rush to confrontation’ with the regime while the latter still retained 
significant support (cf. Mandour 2013). With the hardline opposition insisting on the 
fall of the regime and resorting to periodic violence, the soft-liners in the regime were 
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unlikely to marginalize the hardliners. Senior soft-liners, who spoke the language of 
reconciliation, seemed too far from the immediate levers of repression, which were in 
the hands of hardliners such as Maher al-Asad (Harling 2011). Similarly, internal third 
parties who tried to mediate were squeezed out, notably the traditional opposition 
organized in the National Coordination Committee (NCC), whose members were much 
more experienced than the younger demonstrators. At the famous Samiramis conference 
in June 2011 they put forth a compromise proposal – but both regime and opposition 
rejected it.  
 
Even though the regime conceded many reforms that the opposition had been 
demanding for decades and proposed dialogue, those committed to its removal 
dismissed these initiatives as inadequate and insincere. Besides the moral outrage at the 
killings perpetuated by the government, opposition activists believed that they could 
only be safe if the regime was totally destroyed since it would be certain to seek 
retribution if it survived. The fragmented and localized opposition also lacked credible 
leaders who could deliver its consent to a negotiated settlement should that have 
appeared in its interest. With regime concessions being ‘too little too late’, the 
opposition escalated its resistance via ever larger mass demonstrations which in turn 
provoked violent and repressive counter-escalation by the regime.  
 
But why did mass protest not lead to forced presidential departure, as in Egypt and 
Tunisia, or, if not that, then regime collapse amidst revolution from below? The 
President’s political and clientele ties reached too deeply into the security apparatus to 
separate it from him as had happened in the former Arab countries – and many of the 
elites around him, seeing the regime and their interests in jeopardy were prepared to use 
violence against protestors. While the Asad regime’s increasing use of lethal force 
against non-violent protestors did alienate wide swaths of the public (as the non-violent 
resistance paradigm expects), the opposition could be constructed, among the regime’s 
constituency, as a jihadist ‘other’, because society rapidly became communally 
polarized.  
 
As for the many Syrians caught in the middle, especially the upper and middle classes, 
the regime’s claim to defend order against the disruption unleashed by the Uprising 
caused a significant portion of them to see it as the lesser of two evils. This was all the 
more the case once radical Islamists, and especially al-Qaida-linked jihadists, assumed a 
high profile within the opposition and as the opposition itself fragmented into warring 
camps. Unable to quickly separate the regime from its backers, the opposition sought to 
de-stabilize the regime through interminable mass civil unrest, in order to provoke 
defections from the security forces, undermine the economy, and break the regime 
alliance with business. For this strategy to succeed, it was necessary that external 
constraints deter full-scale regime repression or else that such repression would provoke 
outside intervention. The regime, however, was not deterred by fear of intervention 
from resorting to a ‘military solution’ that did not spare civilians. This hastened Sunni 
defections from the army – specifically to the anti-regime ‘Free Syrian Army’ – and 
later encouraged the rise of jihadists, leading to the militarization of the Uprising. By 
infiltrating and seizing half of Aleppo in 2012, the opposition gave reason for the 
regime to resort to air and artillery attacks on urban built up areas.  
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In parallel, it was the instrumentalization of sub- and trans-state identities by political 
entrepreneurs that turned what was initially a largely urban-rural and class conflict into 
a sectarian one: it was the Asad regime’s securitization of peaceful protest by depicting 
it as Sunni Islamist terrorism that rallied the Alawi community and other minorities to 
the regime and led to the opposition’s later turn, in response, to Sunni Islamist jihadism. 
As order broke down, the ‘security dilemma’ kicked in and each side resorted to 
defensive tactics that made both feel more insecure (Posen 1993). Extremists who 
advocated pre-emptive violence against other communities were empowered and people 
began to be treated according to their communal identity. In fact, something 
approaching ethnic cleansing took place in certain mixed areas, although it was not 
widespread and elsewhere heterogeneity increased—with e.g. an influx of Sunni 
refugees to the Alawi heartland in the west. Hatred and fear of the ‘other’ spread the 
conviction on both sides that no political solution was possible, even when it became 
clear that neither could defeat the other. Overall, the Syrian case validates the 
instrumentalist view of communal internal wars--that it is political entrepreneurs, not 
ancient hatreds--that make for conflict. In the Syrian case it was the regime, but also the 
opposition and external powers later, that sectarianized a conflict that was initially about 
class grievances.  
 
This outcome is quite at odds with the non-violent resistance paradigm in which an 
authoritarian regime’s violence progressively isolates itself from the vast majority of the 
population, precipitating its collapse. This distinguishes Syria from Tunisia and Egypt 
where the incumbent presidents proved unable to get the army to repress mass protest 
survive, thereby enabling a potential democratic transition. This points to the fact, 
ignored by the resistance paradigm, that differences in the social composition of 
authoritarian regimes make for important variations in their vulnerability to revolt 
against it. In more homogeneous societies such as Egypt and Tunisia, mass anti-regime 
mobilization is likely to be much more thorough and decisive than in communally 
divided ones like Syria; and where the presidency’s ties to the military are stronger and 
the army’s institutional autonomy weaker, the military is far less likely to jettison a 
president to save itself. What the non-violent protest paradigm also fails to anticipate is 
the consequences of mass protests that destabilizes the state but fail to lead to 
democratic transition. The outcome may well be a failed state, a Hobbesian world in 
which life becomes ‘nasty, shortish and brute’ and which may be very difficult to 
reverse. This happened in Syria. 
 
 
NEW WARS, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, FAILED STATES AND TERRORISM 
The intractability of the Syrian conflict betrays symptoms of Mary Kaldor’s (1999) 
‘New Wars.’ In her scenario, state weakening empowers transnational non-state actors 
engaged in identity wars and ethnic cleansing, in which the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants breaks down. All the symptoms she describes are 
present in the Syrian case: As the normal economy collapsed, a ‘war economy,’ in 
which people deprived of a normal life and income sought survival through spoils and 
flocked to militant groups with access to largely external funding, gave extra life to the 
conflict despite the damage it was already inflicting on all sides. Warlordism filled the 
security gap as rival factions arose across opposition-controlled areas. Trans-state 
refugee flows, funding by Diasporas and identity groups crossing borders, and 
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transnational arms trafficking embedded the conflict in wider regional struggles that 
made it all the harder to resolve.  
 
Such wars spill over to the neighbours where insurgents may enjoy safe havens. In the 
case of Syria, this happened with Turkey, who harboured and encouraged anti-regime 
rebels (Schanzer and Tahiroglu 2014). Large parts of the Syrian population, caught 
between the warring sides, were displaced internally or fled to neighbouring countries 
and beyond. The spill-over of the conflict impacted negatively on the security of Syria’s 
neighbours (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan), with multi-sectarian Lebanon particularly at 
of risk being drawn into it, especially after the Lebanese Hizbollah intervened in Syria 
on the regime side, thereby inflaming anti-Shia sentiment among Lebanese Sunnis. 
These states also carried a heavy budget burden for refugee support, creating resentment 
among their populations against Syrian refugees. Furthermore, the negative impact of 
protracted conflicts on economic development in border states is well-documented 
(Lambach and Debiel 2010: 164).  
 
The Syrian case throws light on theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency as well. 
As Speers indicates (2008), insurgents traditionally seek to be the fish in the water of 
the population, living off their support. This has been the case in rebel dominated areas 
of Syria, but increasingly, the insurgents also live on outside funding that enables them 
to co-opt elements of the population. Their embedding in the population gave them such 
wide support that it was impossible for the Syrian regime to crush them. This and 
outside arming by rival regional and global powers enabled them to wrest large parts of 
the country from government control. Their main weakness, however, was their extreme 
fragmentation and extensive intra-opposition fighting, which put an end to the 
momentum that seemed to be on their side in 2012 and somewhat re-tilted the balance 
toward the regime in 2013.  
 
The regime’s counter-insurgency methods are identified as ‘traditional tactics’ (Speers 
2008), which includes securing base areas first. It managed to consolidate relative 
control over its heartland, running from Damascus northward via Homs and Hama to 
the coastal provinces where the Alawi community is located. In doing this, the regime 
resorted to starving out insurgents by food control and blockading villages. Theorists 
claim (Spear) that counter-insurgency is most successful if it is made up by 80% 
political and 20% military methods, with a discriminating and well-targeted use of 
force, since the government needs to win over the less committed insurgents in order to 
isolate the hard-core opposition. However, in case the priority is put on protection of 
counter-insurgency forces instead of protection of the population, then firepower and 
airpower will be maximized regardless of collateral damage and political costs. Such 
firepower is particularly unsuited to urban warfare where recent insurgencies, including 
Syria’s, have been fought. In Syria, the demographic disadvantage of the regime meant 
it lacked the military manpower to avoid indiscriminate collateral damage and use of 
heavy weapons against urban neighbourhoods. Indeed, the regime may have 
deliberately used such violence to create refugees, a kind of ethnic cleansing meant to 
change the unfavourable demographic balance.  
 
However, mass punishment of populations is likely to be counterproductive and this 
was certainly the case in Syria, where it provoked the militarization of the opposition. 
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This is especially so in case of modern media wars, in which use of violence can be 
easily recorded with smart phones and held against the perpetrator. In the Syrian case, 
protestors uploaded smart phone images of regime violence to spread disaffection in 
Syria and invite foreign intervention. Indeed, from the beginning, the Syrian war was a 
propaganda war waged by disinformation on both sides (Joya 2012).  
 
Three years after the Uprising began, the country had become divided between regime 
and opposition controlled regions, an egregious example of a failed state. Failed states 
are seen as a threat to international security, with at least one involved in 77% of 
international crises, 1990-2005 (Lamback and Debiel 2010: 161). The US/EU saw 
failed states as potential havens for terrorist groups and Piazza found instability in 19 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states correlated with terrorist activity 
(Lambach and Diebel 2010). Indeed, the Syria conflict was widely seen as a breeding 
ground of terrorism. The vacuum of governance it created gave al-Qaida the opportunity 
to recover its declining fortunes and establish a major armed presence, with two al-
Qaida franchises, Jahhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, rising in 
eastern Syria. They combined ideological motivation, the best fighters, access to natural 
resources (oil) and generous funding from patrons in the Gulf. One result was the 
emergence of a proto-state, the Islamic Caliphate, bridging Syria and Iraq. This was 
constructed as a threat in the West where governments feared that recruits to such 
jihadist groups from their own citizens would be radicalized and pose a threat when 
they returned home.  
 
 
SECURITIZATION, HUMAN SECURITY CRISIS AND HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
 
Security Referents: human security vs. state security 
The Syrian case carries relevance for debates in security studies over the referents of 
securitization. In the Syrian case, the human security view that the state can be a threat 
to its citizens’ security is very well exemplified. The regime resorted to use of live fire 
against demonstrators, and when this stimulated rather than discouraged further 
protests, it escalated the use of violence. This escalation included the use of artillery and 
aerial bombing against urban populations, a selective blockage and starvation of rebel 
areas, and possibly the use of poison gas against opposition neighbourhoods.  
 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the regime and its supporters, the opposition 
were agents of foreign powers seeking to destabilize Syria. There is enough empirical 
evidence to give this view a modicum of credibility: the role played by external exiles 
and internet activists abroad, often Western funded, in provoking or escalating the 
Uprising was congruent with the regime’s perceptions of conspiracy. It tarnished the 
indigenous opposition with the suspicion of treasonous dealings with foreign enemies, 
justifying the resort to repressive violence. Qatar’s al-Jazeera deliberately encouraged 
revolt and Gulf funders provided copious amounts of arms and money to militarize the 
insurgency (Dickinson 2014). Syria became the battleground in a regional power 
struggle between rival states, with Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on 
one side and Iran on the other, each of which perceived the regional power balance and 
their own security at stake. Western and Gulf funding and arming of the opposition and 
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the safe haven provided by Turkey for insurgents contributed to the militarization of the 
conflict as well. What was initially a human security issue became also an inter-state 
one.  
   
Intervention and ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
The prospect of external intervention has loomed over the Syrian conflict from the start. 
Under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, sovereignty is contingent on states 
providing security for their populations and is forfeited when they become threats to it. 
Kerr (2008) argues that global intervention followed by peace building has contributed 
to a reduction in political violence. The Syrian case is widely seen by liberals and 
Syrian oppositionists as a failure of the responsibility to protect doctrine (Adams 2015). 
However, paradoxically, this very doctrine played a role in actually encouraging and 
increasing violent conflict in Syria.  
 
From the outset, the possibility of external military intervention shaped both opposition 
and regime strategies. Anti-regime activists, including Syrian expatriates who were 
instrumental in initiating and internationalizing the Uprising, understood that they could 
not prevail against the regime without effective external constraints on its repressive 
options and some actively courted Western intervention. External activists told those on 
the ground, pointing to the Libya no-fly zone, that ‘the international community won’t 
sit and watch you be killed’. They claimed that another Hama massacre (referring to the 
violent repression of a 1982 Uprising) was not possible because ‘Everything is being 
filmed on YouTube and there’s a lot of international attention on the Middle East’ 
(Seeyle 2011). There were reports that the opposition, particularly external Internet 
activists, systematically exaggerated bloodshed and found willing partners in the 
Western and Gulf-owned press (Joya 2012).  
 
The previous intervention in Libya played a major role in encouraging protestors to 
escalate their confrontation with the regime on the expectation that Asad would need to 
restrain repression to avoid a similar intervention. Indeed, the regime tried to calibrate 
its violence within limits that would not trigger an international intervention, although 
over time this bar was steadily eroded. In mid-2011, it felt the need to quickly smash 
resistance so as not to lose control of territory that could be used to stage intervention as 
had happened in Libya. As it became evident that the West had no appetite for 
intervention the Syrian regime, not dependent on the West as were the Egyptian and 
Tunisian regimes, had little need to restrain its use of violence against opponents. 
 
The West did move to diplomatically isolate and demonize the regime, withdrawing its 
ambassadors, and thereby forfeiting any potential for mediation in the conflict. It 
slapped sanctions on the regime meant to deprive it of oil revenue, which was indeed a 
key step in the debilitation of the Syrian state and of its capacity to provide basic 
services to the population, but not of the regime, which found alternative informal 
sources of revenue. This was yet another example of how blunt an instrument such 
sanctions can be (Bahrami and Parsi 2012). With Western politicians clamouring for 
military intervention and raising the spectre of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the regime inner core realized that there was no way back for them and that they had to 
stick together and do whatever was necessary to survive, including escalating from the 
‘security to a military solution.’ Yet the threats against the regime by the West, while 
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encouraging protestors, proved to be hollow and hence contributed to making a bad 
situation even worse. 
 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DIPLOMACY 
There is considerable research on the conditions for political settlements in security 
studies, notably on negotiations (Zartman 1995) and on techniques (Track II diplomacy) 
to find common ground between the sides. One of the main propositions is that a 
‘hurting stalemate’ provides a key condition for a political compromise (Zartman 2000).  
 
In the Syrian case, efforts were made from the beginning to mediate a compromise 
resolution, notably by a moderate opposition group, the Arab League and by UN special 
envoys. This was rejected by both sides, however. According to participants in a 
workshop on prospects for a settlement, Syria has among the worst possible 
configurations for reaching a negotiated solution (Lynch 2013). To be sure, a hurting 
stalemate appeared to have been reached by at least the third year of the conflict as it 
became apparent that neither side could defeat the other (see. e.g. United Nations, 
2012). However, as more and more blood was shed, powerful animosities were 
generated and neither side could imagine continued coexistence. The so-called 
‘commitment problem’ is exaggerated in such scenarios: an opposition must insist on 
regime change rather than reform because it believes that the regime will renege on 
commitments as soon as the threat to its survival has passed (Fearon 2013). On the other 
hand, the regime could not make too many concessions under threat without looking 
weak and leading to defections and greater mobilization against it.  
 
Each side continued to hope to win by further escalating the level of violence. To the 
extent victory seemed unrealistic, each wanted to first acquire the upper hand before 
going into negotiations. The highly fragmented opposition lacked leadership that could 
deliver the agreement of the whole opposition, particular the fighters on the ground, in 
the event a compromise was reached. There was an excessive number of ‘veto players’ 
and ‘spoilers’ who had no interest in a settlement, such as the jihadists and warlords 
thriving on the war economy. Each side was encouraged by external backers, but while 
these continued to provide their clients with enough support to keep fighting, it was not 
enough to defeat their opponent. A de facto partition soon emerged, with the front lines 
fairly stabilized. But partition was no solution in Syria, since communal groups are too 
intermingled, and, except among some Kurds, permanent division enjoyed little support 
as a solution.  
 
At the time of writing, one side or the other might still collapse, notably if their external 
supporters withdraw the resources needed to continue. However, external players 
appear to be too invested in the outcome to accept defeat of their client. Even though 
60-70% of recent civil wars resulted in the victory by one side or partition (Walters 
2013), in the Syrian case, both sides would probably enjoy too little legitimacy to 
establish uncontested dominance, with the conflict likely to revive at a later point.  
 
International diplomacy, according to Kerr (2008), is increasingly focusing on problems 
of violence in other societies. The UN Security Council is interpreting threats to 
international peace more broadly to encompass internal wars. Third party diplomacy is 
crucial in reaching negotiated settlements and the commitment obstacle can potentially 
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be overcome through an external guarantee of a ceasefire. In the Syrian case, a 
precedent for international diplomatic co-operation seemed to be set by the agreement 
of the regime to give up its weapons of mass destruction, which it was accused of 
having used against its population. Russia’s ability to deliver Asad into the agreement 
stopped the air strikes the US was preparing, which would have had incalculable 
consequences. In spite of this incipient great power diplomatic co-operation, the failure 
of Geneva II conference held in January 2014 to reach a negotiated political settlement 
to the Syrian crisis, is a case study in the limits of diplomacy.  
 
The two great powers, the US and Russia, which were patrons of the two warring sides, 
sponsored negotiations between delegations from the regime and the opposition in exile. 
However, the parties to the conflict had to be pressured by their sponsors to attend and 
did so only to try to demonstrate the intransigence of the other side. The regime insisted 
on demonizing the opposition as terrorists; the opposition refused to countenance any 
solution that including a role for the incumbent president; had the opposition settled for 
less it would have been isolated from its constituency on the ground in Syria (Soukkary 
2014).  
 
To make it work, the regional backers of the two sides would have had to be brought 
into the process and pressured to stop their support for the conflict, but Iran was actually 
excluded from the conference and Saudi Arabia had no faith in it. Even though a 
settlement would have served the apparent shared interest of the two great powers in 
international stability, neither was willing to sufficiently lean on its client to force them 
to compromise. The US administration was unwilling to invest political capital, 
especially since the conflict, despite its risks to regional stability, had become an arena 
in which US enemies (Hezbollah, Al-Qaida) were bloodying each other. Russia saw 
defence of the Asad regime as a bulwark what it saw as the hegemonic expansive 
tendencies of the West (demonstrated, in its view, by the West’s use of a Russian-




Liberals and realists frequently divide over the wisdom of Western policies toward 
security crises in MENA. The Syrian crisis is no exception, where the debate over 
intervention has pitted the ‘realist’ advocates of caution, such as Stephen Walt (2014), 
against both the aggressive ‘liberal imperialism’ of the US neo-cons (Parmar 2009), and 
since the start of the Syrian uprising, the advocates of humanitarian intervention, inside 
and outside the Obama administration.  
 
The hesitancy of the Obama Administration to intervene in Syria must in part be owing 
to an appreciation that regional security threats have often been the consequences of 
previous US interventions in the region. Thus, the threat from ISIS that became so 
salient in mid-2014 was in many ways a ‘blowback’ of Western policy. ISIS is a 
descendant of al-Qaida whose roots go back to Western support of Islamist radicals 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but which has risen most directly out of 
Islamist outrage at US use of Saudi bases to attack Iraq in the 1991 Gulf war (Atwan 
2006). The US destruction of the Iraqi state in America’s 2003 invasion made the 
country a magnet for al-Qaida, created a vacuum where it could operate, and also 
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unleashed the Sunni-Shia sectarianization of the region on which jihadism has thrived 
and found further fertile ground in Syria.  
 
The Syrian Uprising can itself be seen as an outcome of Western policies, at least in 
part. Western democracy promotion and the advocacy of the non-violent resistance 
paradigm showed itself, in MENA at least, to have a far greater potential to destabilize 
states than to promote democracy; it ignored both the conditions under which protest 
could be translated into democratic transition and the high costs, especially in 
fragmented societies, when it fails. Nor has Western liberalism appreciated how 
mechanisms such as R2P and the ICC may actually worsen human security because 
they encourage rebels, expecting external assistance, to uncompromisingly challenge 
regimes – and because regimes, once they start the use of violence, have no way back. 
The international normative climate paradoxically incentivized both sides to keep 
fighting in Syria, when a political solution might have had a better chance, had they 
been left to their own devices or external powers sought to mediate rather than take 
sides in the conflict. Seeming to promise intervention and then failing to do so in the 
Syrian case created the worse of all scenarios.  
 
Finally, framing political struggles in terms of good and bad tends to debilitate the 
international diplomacy needed to cope with them. Thus, the refusal of the West to 
engage with both regime and opposition and invest the political capital in diplomatic 
brokerage of a power sharing settlement in Syria, manifest in the failure at Geneva II, 
opened the door to the Islamic State scenario, which drew the West into a conflict with 
much higher costs that might have been avoided under a different policy. By 
comparison to the dismal recent harvest of Western liberalism in MENA, ‘defensive 
realism’ of the type promoted by Stephen Walt (2014), with its advocacy of caution and 
limited objectives, respect for sovereignty, and priority for diplomacy over military 
intervention, has garnered increased credibility.  
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